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Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems sepa-rately or jointly? We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the numberof electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables (district magnitude and prox-
imity of presidential and legislative elections), one intervening variable (effective number of presidential
candidates), and two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of
ethnopolitical groups (fragmentation and concentration). Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently
reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However,
the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest
amount of variance in the number of parties. These results emphasize the importance of ethnopolitical
cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems, with important
implications for the stability of Africa’s emerging democracies in which parties are weak and multiethnic
coalitions are fluid.
Do electoral institutions and ethnopoliticalcleavages shape the structure (the fragmenta-tion or concentration) of party systems sepa-
rately or jointly? If they shape the structure of party
systems jointly, how can this joint effect be theoreti-
cally specified and empirically tested? If ethnopolitical
groups and associated ethnopolitical cleavages are not
primordially fixed but constructed in the course of so-
cial, economic, and political interactions, as the accu-
mulated findings of over three decades of comparative
research on ethnopolitics attest, how can constructed
ethnopolitical groups be specified and associated eth-
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nopolitical cleavages measured? Do measures of eth-
nopolitical cleavages premised on constructivist logic
and processes offer better explanations of variations
in the structure of party systems, independently and in
combination with electoral institutions, than measures
based on primordialist logic? What are the implications
of how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleav-
ages shape party systems for the stability of Africa’s
unconsolidated democracies in which political parties
are weak and multiethnic coalitions fluid?
To answer these questions systematically, we utilize
two new data sets on African countries—one on elec-
tions and electoral institutions and the other on eth-
nopolitical groups and cleavages. While empirically fo-
cused on Africa, our analysis and data sets are designed
to address three substantive theoretical issues in com-
parative scholarship that are reflected in the preceding
list of questions. The first issue concerns the compet-
ing emphases on electoral institutions and social cleav-
ages as mutually exclusive determinants of the struc-
ture of party systems and recent attempts to bridge this
theoretical divide. Arguing for their joint impact, we
employ the notion of embedded institution to clarify
how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages
structure the strategic coordination of voters and can-
didates over votes and seats, and we systematically test
for their independent, additive, and interactive effects
on the fragmentation or concentration of party systems
as measured by the number of electoral and legisla-
tive parties. The second issue concerns the accumulated
findings in comparative scholarship that ethnic groups,
identities, and cleavages are not primordially fixed, but
are constructed in the course of social, economic, and
political interactions, and the analytical implications of
this constructivist approach for specifying ethnopoliti-
cal groups, measuring the cleavages among them, and
incorporating these measures in explaining variations
in the structure of party systems. We reject primor-
dialism and draw on the insights of the constructivist
approach to specify ethnopolitical groups (constructed
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and politicized ethnic groups, as discussed below) and
measure the cleavages among and within them. Our
data analysis shows that these specifications and mea-
sures provide improved accounts of variations in the
number of electoral and legislative parties. The third
issue concerns the prospects for stability of unconsoli-
dated emerging democracies. We proceed by clarifying
the first two issues, followed by a description of our
research design and the presentation of data analysis.
In the conclusion, we speculate on how our analysis
helps to clarify the third issue.
INSTITUTIONS, CLEAVAGES, AND PARTY
SYSTEMS
An important debate in the comparative literature on
parties and party systems involves the competing em-
phasis on electoral institutions (Duverger 1962) and
social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) as mutually
exclusive determinants of the structure of party sys-
tems. But scholars also recognize that social cleavages
condition institutional effects. Thus, plurality formu-
las that typically produce two-party systems also tend
to foster multiparty systems if voters are regionally
concentrated and vote as a block, as, for example, in
India and Canada (Rae 1971). And proportional for-
mulas predictably tend to increase the number of par-
ties but only in ethnically heterogeneous societies and
not in ethnically homogeneous ones (Ordeshook and
Shvetsova 1994). These emendations suggest the possi-
bility of a joint impact of electoral institutions and social
cleavages on the structure of party system. In particular,
they underscore the importance of two dimensions of
ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the direct effects
of electoral institutions: ethnopolitical fragmentation
and ethnopolitical concentration. We present quanti-
tative measures of both dimensions and test their in-
dependent as well as additive and interactive effects
with each other and with electoral institutions on the
number of electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s
emerging democracies.
Embedded Institutions
Systematically sorting out the independent and joint
effects of institutions and cleavages on party systems re-
quires a theoretical specification of these relationships
that denies a priori privilege to either institutions or
cleavages. The notion of “embedded institutions” pro-
vides this specification. It conceptualizes electoral in-
stitutions as embedded in wider social contexts, raising
the possibility that similar institutions may not produce
similar outcomes in different contexts and leaving the
validation or rejection of that possibility to empirical
investigation (Grofman et al. 1999).
The notion of embedded institution highlights
how electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages
shape party systems. Electoral institutions and ethnop-
olitical cleavages shape party systems as sources of
information that structure the mutual expectations of
voters and candidates about winning and losing, thus
facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and
seats. However, the information that the two variables
contain and convey may not necessarily be consistent;
indeed, they may be at odds with each other. This may
explain why electoral institutions do not always pro-
duce their expected results in many new democracies
(Moser 2001; Mozaffar 1997). That expected institu-
tional outcomes do not obtain, however, is often in-
terpreted as an indication of the failure of electoral
institutions to perform in expected ways. An alterna-
tive, but related, explanation is that contextual vari-
ables provide more relevant information for voters and
candidates that modifies the impact of electoral insti-
tutions. It is a useful research strategy, therefore, to
sort out this relationship of structured tension between
electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages by
specifying and examining their independent, additive,
and interactive effects on the structure of party systems.
Strategic Coordination
The strategic coordination role of electoral institutions
is now well established (see, e.g., Cox 1997; Lijphart
1994; Sartori 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Cox’s
(1997) definitive work clarifies the central logic: (a)
candidates wish to get elected and voters wish to gain
the benefits of voting for winners, and (b) candidates’
and voters’ expectations of winning and losing tend to
be mutually reinforcing. Electoral institutions structure
these two micro-level processes, which, in turn, affect
the number of electoral and legislative parties. The
role of electoral institutions in strategic coordination
is premised on political actors’ knowledge and under-
standing of the information embodied in these insti-
tutions. In emerging democracies, however, electoral
institutions are new and their incentives and outcomes
not well known or understood by political actors, who
compensate for the resulting information deficit by re-
lying on alternative sources of information and coordi-
nation. In Africa, ethnopolitical groups and cleavages
are these alternative sources.
Ethnopolitical groups facilitate strategic coordina-
tion because the identities that define them are strategic
resources that are contingently (not reflexively) acti-
vated to define group interests and that help to reduce
the cost of collective political action in response to the
institutional incentives that structure the competition
for power and resources. In Africa, colonial institutions
established the initial institutional incentives for con-
structing and politicizing ethnic groups and identities,
while varied postcolonial regimes reinforced the incen-
tives for sustaining and occasionally redefining these
groups and identities, as discussed in the next section
(Laitin 1986; Rothchild 1997).
How ethnopolitical cleavages facilitate strategic co-
ordination among voters and candidates to shape the
structure of party systems depends largely on patterns
of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration. An-
alysts generally posit an isomorphic relationship be-
tween ethnopolitical cleavages and party systems on
the assumption that each ethnopolitical group involved
in a cleavage is totally separate from others and is also
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sufficiently large and internally cohesive to support a
party by itself. Thus, ceteris paribus, large numbers of
cleavages (high ethnopolitical fragmentation) increase
and small numbers of cleavages (low ethnopolitical
fragmentation) reduce the number of parties. How-
ever, the nature of constructed ethnopolitical groups
in Africa and the resulting cleavages that we describe
below reveal a complex group morphology that seri-
ously militates against such a reflexive relationship be-
tween ethnopolitical cleavages and party system struc-
ture. Specifically, African ethnopolitical demography
features politically salient differences within as well as
among groups. The resulting high ethnopolitical frag-
mentation, ceteris paribus, either produces such a high
degree of vote dispersion among large numbers of small
parties that most are unlikely to secure enough votes
to win seats or produces small numbers of large mul-
tiethnic parties by encouraging them to campaign for
votes across both intergroup and intragroup cleavages.
Either way, high ethnopolitical fragmentation is likely
to reduce the number of parties.
African ethnopolitical groups, however, also ex-
hibit the highest levels of geographic concentration
in the world (Gurr 1993). Such concentrations, espe-
cially when they exist “in above-plurality proportions
in particular constituencies and geographical pockets”
(Sartori 1994, 40), help to counteract the reductive ef-
fect of ethnopolitical fragmentation on the number of
parties. Geographic concentration by itself, however,
is unlikely to overcome the reductive effect of high
fragmentation due to the presence of large numbers of
small ethnopolitical groups. Countries with low frag-
mentation, moreover, feature a small number of large
ethnopolitical groups that are also likely to have dis-
persed populations and, therefore, do not need con-
centrated voters to sustain a small number of parties.
These variations in the configurations of ethnopolitical
cleavages suggest the likelihood of an interactive effect
of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration on
the structure of party systems.
The magnitude of this effect will depend on the dis-
trict magnitude, that is, the number of seats in each
electoral district. District magnitude shapes party sys-
tems by setting a minimum threshold of votes required
to win one seat (or, conversely, the maximum number
of votes a party can secure without winning a seat) and
thus influencing the proportionality between votes and
seats. Ceteris paribus, small districts set high thresh-
olds that increase vote-seat disproportionality and re-
duce the number of parties, while large districts set low
thresholds that reduce vote-seat disproportionality and
increase the number of parties.
Presidential elections also play a crucial role in shap-
ing the structure of party systems (Cox 1997, 187–90,
203–21; Jones 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992). This has
special resonance in Africa, where all new democracies,
except Lesotho and South Africa, have adopted presi-
dential systems. Presidential elections in Africa are im-
portant for three reasons. First, with the presidency as
the top prize in the political game, presidential elections
attract a large number of candidates, few of whom have
any realistic chance of winning. Characteristic prob-
lems of postauthoritarian democracies—limited expe-
rience with competitive elections, information deficit
about the extent of electoral support, plus personal
ambition—prevent opposition candidates from coor-
dinating on a single candidate to oppose incumbents
armed with the standard advantages of incumbency.
Second, an important strategic reason for the entry
of large numbers of contenders in presidential elec-
tions is that African presidents possess substantial re-
sources for patronage. Presidential contenders with
weak winning potential often expect to demonstrate
sufficient electoral support to bargain entry into post-
election coalitions and secure state resources for their
constituencies in return for political support of the
winners. Third, for leading presidential candidates the
electoral base and bargaining resources possessed by
weaker candidates are also strategically important be-
cause of the salience of ethnopolitical groups for elec-
toral support. Just as it constrains legislative candi-
dates, the combination of ethnopolitical fragmentation
and concentration may also constrain leading presiden-
tial candidates from securing outright electoral majori-
ties. And since the weaker candidates often control
small but cohesive blocks of votes, leading presidential
contenders have strong incentives to form minimum-
winning coalitions with them to ensure an electoral
victory and a governing majority.
The extent to which strong and weak presidential
contenders are able to negotiate minimum-winning
coalitions will depend, among other things, on the prox-
imity of presidential and legislative elections and the
number of presidential candidates (Cox 1997, 209–
13). Greater proximity of presidential and legislative
elections tends to reduce the number of parties due
to the coattail effects of winning presidential candi-
dates. Large numbers of presidential candidates have
the opposite effect due to the influence of ethnopolitical
cleavages.
In addressing these substantive theoretical concerns,
our analysis builds on the only two studies, of which we
are aware, that also test for the independent, additive,
and interactive effects of electoral institutions and eth-
nic heterogeneity on the number of electoral (Cox 1997,
esp. 203–21) and legislative (Ordeshook and Shvetsova
1994) parties.1 But our analysis also extends their theo-
retical insights in two specific ways. First, the two studies
measure ethnic heterogeneity by a fractionalization in-
dex that is based on primordialist specification of ethnic
groups and, therefore, can neither distinguish politi-
cally relevant ethnic groups from irrelevant ones nor
capture politically salient intragroup differences. We
focus only on ethnopolitical groups, that is, on politically
relevant ethnic groups specified by the logic of con-
structivism. Our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages,
therefore, capture multiple levels of politically salient
cleavages consistent with the complex morphology of
ethnopolitical groups in African countries. Second, the
two studies focus only on ethnic fragmentation, while
1 Powell (1982) also focused on the joint effects of electoral insti-
tutions and social heterogeneity but examined only their additive
effects on the number of legislative parties.
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The logic of constructivism turns on the notion that
individuals have multiple ethnic identities that are con-
structed in the course of social, economic, and politi-
cal interactions. This malleability of ethnic identities
derives (a) from the multiplicity of objective ethnic
markers (language, religion, race, caste, “tribe,” terri-
tory, etc.) that may be invoked to define and distinguish
ethnic groups, (b) from the relative complexity of these
markers that may foster intragroup divisions combined
with intergroup differences (e.g., sectarian divisions
in a religion, “tribal” differences among same lan-
guage speakers, or subjects of the same kingdom), and
(c) from temporal changes in the relevance of these
composite markers and their components in defining
and distinguishing ethnic groups as well as in the politic-
ization of resulting intergroup and intragroup cleavages
(Chandra 2001, 7–8; Laitin and Posner 2001, 13–16).
Intrinsic to the logic of constructivism are three spe-
cific processes that motivate our criteria for specify-
ing the ethnopolitical groups and the cleavages among
them that we include in our analysis: construction,
politicization, and particization. We do not explicate
the construction of ethnic groups and cleavages, but we
do highlight its salient features because it is a necessary
precondition for the politicization of ethnic groups, that
is, the construction of ethnic groups into ethnopolitical
groups. Like other social cleavages, however, not all
ethnic cleavages become politicized, and even fewer
become “particized, that is, made into important lines
of partisan division” (Cox 1997, 26, original emphasis).
We describe below how this crucial distinction between
particization and other forms of politicization of ethnic
cleavages helps to solve the problem of endogeneity
that is ostensibly inherent in measuring ethnopolitical
cleavages for explaining variations in the number of
electoral and legislative parties.
An ethnic group is constructed when individuals in
culturally plural societies self-consciously choose one
or more objective ethnic markers to distinguish in-
groups from out-groups. In Africa, as elsewhere, the in-
dividuals’ choice of ethnic markers and the consequent
size of the constructed ethnic groups are constrained by
the variety, complexity, and prior use of such markers,
the associated cost of forming new groups and sustain-
ing group solidarity, and the institutional framework
of governance defined by the state. Increased variety
and complexity of ethnic markers expand opportuni-
ties for ethnic group construction but also constrain
unfettered construction of especially large and cohe-
sive ethnic groups because of (a) the high start-up cost
of group formation associated with the incorporation
2 This section draws on materials and data presented in Scarritt and
Mozaffar 1999.
of competing groups and interests defined by varied
ethnic makers to construct larger and more encom-
passing ethnic groups and (b) the high cost of sustain-
ing group solidarity in the face of the varied markers
serving as competing sources of group definition within
the larger constructed agglomerations. These structural
and strategic factors thus limit the size and the cohesion
of ethnic groups that can be constructed and mobilized
for collective political action.
In Africa, colonial rule and postcolonial regimes re-
inforced these constraints by structuring the variety and
complexity of ethnic markers and politicizing some of
them. Colonial rulers’ reliance on local agents to cope
with the dilemma of maintaining control at low cost
encouraged these agents to differentiate their groups
from those not so privileged by colonial authority either
by recombining and redefining existing objective mark-
ers of ethnicity or by accentuating previously minor
group differences (Vail 1989). Colonial rulers’ creation
of administrative units to secure additional economies
in the cost of governance incorporated culturally dis-
parate groups within single administrative units or sep-
arated culturally similar groups into separate units.
Occasionally, administrative encapsulation enabled the
combination and redefinition of different ethnic mark-
ers for the construction of larger, territorially concen-
trated and, hence, also cohesive ethnopolitical groups.
In other instances, colonial rulers privileged one ethnic
marker (e.g., ancestral village) to foster spatially dis-
tributed, hence fragmented, groups over another (e.g.,
religion) that could foster larger and more encompass-
ing groups (Laitin 1986). In these different ways, colo-
nial rule emphasized the relevance of a wide range
of diffuse and heterogeneous criteria of group forma-
tion, thereby increasing instead of decreasing the va-
riety and complexity of objective ethnic markers that
constrained the construction and politicization of large
and cohesive ethnic groups in Africa’s culturally plural
societies.
At independence, therefore, African countries inher-
ited a distinctive ethnic morphology with three defin-
ing features that are reflected in the structure of con-
structed ethnopolitical groups and that have shaped
the pattern of their political interactions: (1) marked
differences in group size, such that virtually no major
ethnopolitical group comprises an outright majority
in a country, although some comprise a large plural-
ity; (2) considerable variety and complexity in ethnic
markers, such that, even as they produce politically
salient interethnic differences, they also produce polit-
ically salient intragroup heterogeneity but limited cul-
tural differences among large agglomerations of such
groups; and (3) the territorial concentration of some
ethnic groups that facilitates their construction as large
and cohesive units for collective political action. These
three features have combined with the accommoda-
tion by postcolonial regimes of instrumental (“pork-
barrel”) ethnopolitical demands to foster communal
contention as the typical pattern of political interactions
in which ethnopolitical groups serve as cost-effective
strategic resource for organizing political competi-
tion for power and resources. Communal contention,
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however, underscores the high start-up cost of new
group formation and the high maintenance cost
of group solidarity, thus discouraging political en-
trepreneurs from exaggerating cultural differences
among groups and encouraging them instead to main-
tain strong group identities, including some coexisting
subgroup identities, that are strategically sustained by
their ability to access the state and secure valued goods
and services for their followers (Mozaffar and Scarritt
1999, 239–42).
The constructivist processes highlighted above mo-
tivate five criteria for specifying ethnopolitical groups
and cleavages. The first, which derives from the distinc-
tion among the construction, politicization, and parti-
cization of ethnic groups and helps to avoid the endo-
geneity problem noted above, involves specifying only
those groups that have demonstrated their actual po-
litical relevance or high potential political relevance
based on past relevance, apart from or prior to par-
ticization. We thus employ the decision rule that the
incidence of at least one of the following several forms
of long-standing politicization other than particization
is a necessary and sufficient indicator of the construc-
tion of ethnopolitical groups: (a) organized group mo-
bilization unrelated to party formation (primarily in
ethnic associations or cliques of leaders within the same
party, the bureaucracy, or the military); (b) articulation
of grievances by leaders claiming to speak for a group
rather than a party; (c) participation in collective action
or (violent or nonviolent) conflict with other groups
or the state and being subjected to state violence;
(d) encapsulation within or domination of an officially
designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a dispro-
portionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy
or the military; and (f) controlling disproportionate so-
cioeconomic resources.
The second criterion involves specifying all ethnopo-
litical groups, even at the risk of being overly inclusive.
Thus our decision rule deliberately defines forms of
nonparty politicization broadly. Furthermore, we draw
on the extensive secondary Africanist literature in his-
tory, anthropology, sociology, and political science to
assess the demonstrated and potential political rele-
vance of a wide range of ethnic groups to arrive at
the list of ethnopolitical groups included in our data
set.3 The third criterion involves specifying ethnopo-
litical groups at three levels of inclusiveness in order
to capture all cleavages that may affect variations in
party system structure, including national dichotomous
cleavages between top-level groups (which are found in
twelve countries), as well as a variety of more complex
multiethnic ones usually involving both middle-level
groups (within or independent of top level groups) and
lower-level groups within them. The fourth criterion in-
volves specifying the geographic concentration of eth-
nopolitical groups and subgroups. As noted above, ter-
ritorial concentration facilitates ethnopolitical group
3 We acknowledge that in the case of ambiguity in the secondary
literature, we relied on our best judgments based on our knowledge
and expertise to assess demonstrated political relevance of specified
groups.
construction by furnishing a critical mass of individuals
with similar interests based on common location, thus
reducing the start-up cost of group formation and the
maintenance cost of group solidarity. The final criterion
concerns specifying the time frame for the cleavages
that we analyze. Thus, to be included in our data set,
ethnic groups at all levels of inclusiveness must have
been politicized at least 10 years prior to the first elec-
tion analyzed in each country, which helps to avoid the
problem of endogeneity, and the most recent evidence
of their politicization must be no more than 20 years
prior to this election, which helps to establish their
continued, and potential for future, politicization.4
Based on these five criteria, we specified 242 ethnop-
olitical groups and subgroups at three levels of inclu-
siveness in 34 countries that held multiparty elections
between 1980 and 2000. These countries and elections
are the focus of our analysis, and the 242 groups are the
basis of our two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages,
fragmentation and concentration. Ethnic groups that
did not meet one or more of the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for politicization specified above, or
are subgroups of our lower-level groups, are excluded
from the analysis (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999, 88–91).
MEASURES, METHODS, AND MODELS
Variable Operationalizations
Party Systems. The structure of the party system mea-
sured by the number of electoral and the number of
legislative parties is the dependent variable in our anal-
ysis. We employ the widely used indices developed by
Laakso and Taagepera (1989) to operationalize both
measures: Effective Number of Electoral Parties and
Effective Number of Legislative Parties.
Electoral Institutions. District Magnitude is now
widely acknowledged as the decisive institutional vari-
able in shaping the structure of party systems. Because
countries with proportional representation formulas
for converting votes into seats have multiple districts
of varying size, we follow Lijphart (1994) and utilize
average district magnitude as the summary measure for
district magnitude. Also, because of the potential curvi-
linear relationship between district magnitude and the
number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994,
106–7), we utilize the natural log of district magnitude.5
4 We made an exception to the 10-year rule for inclusion in the case
of politicization of groups through violence because this is so clearly
independent of particization. For example, ethnic associations that
were instrumental in politicizing the Yorubas and the lbos in Nigeria
were founded in the 1920s and 1930s and have continued to be active
within the last 20 years, while the politicization of the Ogoni and
other “oil minorities” in that country occurred only a little more than
10 years prior to the 1999 election and involved considerable violence.
This criterion means that politicized groups remain constant for all
of the elections analyzed in this article, although their particization
may change between elections. The analysis of future elections may
require that changes in politicization be taken into account.
5 For other measures of district magnitude, see Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, 126–41, 264–69.
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Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections is
also an important institutional variable that shapes the
structure of party systems. We utilize Cox’s (1997, 209–
13) formula to operationalize this variable. Cox extends
the insights of the comparative literature on the reduc-
tive effects of presidential elections on the number of
parties (Shugart and Carey 1992) with a more refined
interval measure of the degree of proximity between
presidential and legislative elections instead of the stan-
dard nominal measure of the two elections as concur-
rent or separate. Proximity is a matter of degree and
ranges from maximal proximity (concurrent elections)
to zero proximity when legislative elections are held at
the presidential midterm. Between these extremes, as
proximity increases presidential elections tend to re-
duce the number electoral and legislative parties. The
magnitude of this effect depends on the degree of frac-
tionalization of presidential elections as measured by
the effective number of presidential candidates (Cox
1997, 211–13). We, therefore, also examine the inter-
action of the proximity of presidential and legislative
elections with the effective number of presidential can-
didates, Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elec-
tions × Effective Number of Presidential Candidates.
Constructed Ethnopolitical Cleavages: Fragmenta-
tion and Concentration. We use two indices to oper-
ationalize the two dimensions of constructed ethnopo-
litical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration. The
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation index is based on
the share of the politicized population that belongs to
each ethnopolitical group or subgroup. Most countries
have different fragmentation scores derived from these
population shares, depending on which of the three lev-
els of inclusiveness is used to calculate the index. For
some countries, these differences will range from very
low to very high fragmentation. A strict application of
constructivist logic might require calculating fragmen-
tation at the level having greatest relevance at the time
of a given election, but that would be almost impossible
to do and would increase the danger of endogeneity by
conflating politicization and particization. Therefore,
we use the index of total fragmentation in our analysis.
This index combines all three levels of inclusiveness by
including all undivided top and middle-level groups and
all lowest-level groups. In other words, total fragmenta-
tion includes all groups that are potentially politically
relevant at the national level, while excluding groups
that have not been politicized. We thus relate the great-
est possible nationally relevant ethnopolitical fragmen-
tation as identified in our data set to variations in the
structure of the party system, which makes theoretical
sense since parties can appeal to groups at any of the
three levels of inclusiveness.
The Ethnopolitical Group Concentration index is
based on concentration codes adapted from the Mi-
norities at Risk (Phase III) data set: 0 = widely dis-
persed, 1 = primarily urban or minority in one region,
2 = majority in one region, dispersed in others, and
3 = concentrated in one region (Gurr 1993). The index
for each group is calculated by multiplying its concen-
tration code by its share of the ethnopolitically rele-
vant population in the country, with the results for all
groups summed to obtain the ethnopolitical group con-
centration score for the country. Because we wish to ex-
amine whether fragmentation and concentration have
independent or joint effects on the number of parties,
we include an interaction term reflecting their product
in the analysis, Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration.
Comparison with Other Measures of Ethnic
and Ethnopolitical Cleavages
One of our important claims in this article is that our
measures of ethnopolitical cleavages offer better ac-
counts of the number of electoral and legislative parties
than measures that are not based on our measurement
criteria. To test this claim, we examine the effects of two
such measures. One is the widely used Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization (ELF) Index. Based principally on
data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), it assumes
that ethnic groups are primordially fixed, measures eth-
nic rather than ethnopolitical cleavages, specifies only
one level of cleavage, and does not measure concen-
tration. Our test shows that it has no significant effect
on the structure of party systems in Africa’s emerging
democracies.
The second measure we test is the politically rel-
evant ethnic groups (PREG) index developed by
Posner (2000) in response to the flawed application of
the ELF index by economists to explain the negative
impact of ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth in
Africa. Posner started from the Atlas Narodov Mira
(1964) data to develop a baseline population count (la-
beled Count C) that includes all ethnic groups listed
in the Atlas. Then he used secondary sources on polit-
ical competition to eliminate groups that are not rel-
evant to economic policymaking and, in some coun-
tries, to disaggregate ethnic groups that are politically
divided or to combine ethnic groups that act together
politically. This method produced a second population
count (Count B) that specifies ethnopolitical groups at
a higher level of aggregation but with less inclusive-
ness than in Count C. The groups in Count B were
further reduced in number or aggregated to develop
a new population count (Count A). The PREG index
derived from groups specified in Count B comes closest
to approximating the fragmentation index that we have
developed in the sense of including the most ethnopo-
litical groups; hence we expected it to be more closely
related to the number of electoral and legislative parties
than the previously discussed ELF measure. Our test
shows, however, that its relationship with these out-
comes is weakened by it failure to include all ethnopo-
litical cleavages or geographic concentration.
Case Selection
Our analysis is based on data from 62 elections to the
lower chamber of national legislatures in 34 African
countries that underwent democratic transitions in
the context of the third wave of democratization. In
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focusing on elections as the unit of analysis, we fol-
low Rae (1971) but acknowledge Lijphart’s (1994, 7)
criticism of Rae that “elections under the same rules
are not really independent cases but merely repeated
operations of the same electoral system.” We also ex-
amine 15 countries that have held only one election in
conjunction with countries that have held multiple elec-
tions, which unduly treats the electoral systems in both
groups as temporally stable. The temporal stability of
electoral system is a key assumption underlying the hy-
pothesized relationship between electoral institutions
and party systems, but there is no “wholly satisfactory
methodology . . . to learn the ‘true’ (stable) number
of parties in a regime that encompasses . . . two or
three elections” (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 102).
Therefore, while cognizant of these problems in case
selection, we adopt a pragmatic approach of including
the maximum number of cases in our analysis.
Model Specification
We utilize OLS regression to test eight specifications,
four each for Effective Number of Electoral Parties and
Effective Number of Legislative Parties. Model 1 is an
institutional specification that includes variables mea-
suring legislative electoral institutions (District Mag-
nitude) and two aspects of presidential elections, the
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections and
the interaction between the Proximity of Presidential
and Legislative Elections and the Effective Number
of Presidential Candidates. Model 2 is a sociological
specification that tests for the independent effects of
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation and Ethnopoliti-
cal Group Concentration as well as their interactive ef-
fects (Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X Ethnop-
olitical Group Concentration). Model 3 is an additive
specification in which all six variables in the previous
two models are entered in the equation. Model 4 is
an additive/interactive specification and hence a fully
specified model. It includes five variables in Model 3
but replaces the interaction of the two measures of eth-
nopolitical cleavages in that model with an interaction
term reflecting the product of district magnitude and
the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages (District
Magnitudes X Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration).6
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 display the results of each set of four
specifications for the Effective Number of Electoral
Parties and the Effective Number of Legislative Par-
ties, respectively. For both dependent variables, all four
models are statistically significant and all independent
variables correctly signed and statistically significant.
The purely institutional specification (Model 1) ex-
plains 19% of the variance in the number of elec-
toral parties and 24% of the variance in the number
6 See Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990, esp. 40–42, for the motivating
logic for the three-way interaction of independent variables.
of legislative parties. The purely sociological model
(Model 2), which tests for the independent and inter-
active effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation and con-
centration, explains 30% of the variance in the num-
ber of electoral parties (an increase of 11% over the
institutional model) and 40% of the variance in the
number of legislative parties (an increase of 16% over
the institutional model). In Model 3, the additive ef-
fects of electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleav-
ages account for 40% of the variance in the electoral
party system, increasing the explanatory power of the
additive model by 21% over the institutional model,
and 53% of the variance in the legislative party system,
increasing the explanatory power of the additive model
by 29% over the institutional model. The fully specified
model (Model 4) explains 50% of the variance in the
electoral party system and 52% of the variance in the
legislative party system.
Overall, these results confirm the importance of eth-
nopolitical cleavages in structuring the strategic coor-
dination among voters and candidates and in mediating
the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of
party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies. Ex-
amination of the effects of individual clusters of vari-
ables provides additional confirmation. Models 2 and
3 confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages
in shaping the structure of party systems, both inde-
pendently and interactively. Ethnopolitical fragmen-
tation independently reduces the number of electoral
and legislative parties in both models.7 This reductive
effect, which stems from the distinctive morphology
of African ethnopolitical groups that we noted above
and that our data set captures, suggests that increased
number of group cleavages encourages candidates to
forge intergroup alliances to improve on their electoral
gains. Such alliances, while improving the prospect of
group cooperation, also tend to reduce the number
of electoral and legislative parties. Ethnopolitical con-
centration, however, counteracts this reductive effect
of fragmentation. For example, when group concen-
tration is high, at 2.56, group fragmentation tends to
increase the effective number of electoral parties by .04
and the effective number of legislative parties by .03.
Correspondingly, when group concentration is low at
.63, group fragmentation tends to reduce the effective
number of electoral parties by −.04 and the effective
number of legislative seats by −.02.8 This counteracting
influence of ethnopolitical concentration on ethnopo-
litical fragmentation remains even with the addition of
institutional variables in Model 3.
These important results can be explained by the
role of group concentration in reducing the transac-
tion costs of forging and sustaining group solidarity.
Scholars of social movements (Tarrow 1994) have
7 We ran a separate equation without the interaction term to confirm
the independent effects of ethnopolitical fragmentation. We do not
report the results to save space.
8 We derived these conditional effects of fragmentation on the num-
ber of electoral and legislative parties by calculating the value of one
standard deviation of the concentration index above and below the
mean value of the index and entering these values into an equation
to obtain the additive and multiplicative coefficients.
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TABLE 1. Determinants of Effective Number of Electoral Parties
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
District Magnitude (logged) .10 .34 −1.62∗∗∗
(.52) (.53) (.42)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections −4.50∗∗ −3.25∗ −2.80∗∗
(1.41) (1.30) (1.03)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections × 1.50∗∗ .97∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (.48) (.33) (.28)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation −.07∗∗ −.06∗ −.03∗∗∗
(.02) (.03) (.01)
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration .17 .03 .68∗∗
(.29) (.39) (.27)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × .04∗∗ .04∗
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration (.02) (.02)
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration .03∗∗∗
(.00)
Constant 3.80∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗
(.95) (.21) (.74) (.75)
R2 .19 .30 .40 .50
F 3.81∗ 4.50∗∗ 3.58∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗
N 62 62 62 62
Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ∗ p< .05, ∗∗ p< .01, ∗∗∗ p< .001.
TABLE 2. Determinants of Effective Number of Legislative Parties
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
District Magnitude (Logged) .17 .26 −.65∗∗
(.20) (.17) (.23)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections −2.76∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗
(.62) (.50) (.44)
Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections × .89∗∗∗ .53∗∗ .58∗∗∗
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (.20) (.17) (.16)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation −.03∗∗ −.03∗∗ −.01∗
(.01) (.01) (.00)
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration .17 .09 .49∗∗
(.16) (.18) (.19)
Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation × .02∗∗ .02∗∗
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration (.01) (.01)
District Magnitude × Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation ×
Ethnopolitical Group Concentration .01∗∗∗
(.00)
Constant 2.66∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗
(.48) (.15) (.30) (.31)
R2 .24 .40 .53 .52
F 8.05∗∗∗ 6.69∗∗∗ 8.30∗∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗
N 62 62 62 62
Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ∗ p< .05, ∗∗ p< .01, ∗∗∗ p< .001.
found, for instance, that unmediated communication
of ideas, strategies, and resources is crucial for re-
ducing the collective action costs of group cohesion.
The effectiveness of such communication derives from
the face-to-face interaction in small groups that typi-
cally constitute the larger social movements as loosely
linked “congeries of social networks” (Tarrow 1994,
22). African ethnopolitical groups are not social move-
ments, but their morphologies are conceptually similar.
As described above, the combinations of cleavages
among and within groups that typically characterize
African ethnopolitical groups diminish the effective-
ness of strategic face-to-face interaction in forging
groups that are sufficiently large and cohesive to sus-
tain political parties of their own. Group concentra-
tion, however, helps to overcome this constraint. The
physical proximity engendered by group concentration
facilitates the strategic face-to-face interaction of small
groups, which helps to solidify the otherwise loose links
among the subgroups. The associated affinity of place,
moreover, helps to define the common interests of the
emergent, spatially anchored larger group in electoral
competition with similarly constructed groups. This
process is the key to the interactive effect of ethnopolit-
ical group fragmentation and concentration on increas-
ing the number of electoral and legislative parties in
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Africa’s emerging democracies. And this effect obtains
with or without the effect of electoral institutions.
The variables related to presidential elections consis-
tently demonstrate the substantial effect of the Prox-
imity of Presidential and Legislative Elections in re-
ducing the number of electoral and legislative parties,
reproducing in Africa the almost-universal tendency
of presidential regimes to constrict the structure of
party systems. But, just as consistently, the interaction
of proximity and the Effective Number of Presiden-
tial Candidates counters this effect, indicating, for the
reasons detailed above, the importance of ethnopoliti-
cal cleavages in shaping strategic entry as well as voter
behavior in presidential elections (Cox 1997, 211).
District magnitude, widely acknowledged as the de-
cisive institutional variable in shaping the structure of
party systems, has no independent effect (Models 1 and
3). This unexpected result may reflect the workings of
weakly institutionalized electoral systems, but it also
indicates the effect of context. The two, of course, are
not mutually exclusive. District magnitude is a hard
constraint to which political actors must strategically
adjust. In emerging democracies, however, political
actors’ limited knowledge and understanding of in-
stitutional incentives and the salience of ethnopoliti-
cal cleavages as alternative incentive structures vitiate
the expected strategic consequences of district magni-
tude, but without totally removing its mechanical ef-
fects. In other words, candidates and voters in emerg-
ing democracies rely on familiar cues of ethnopolitical
affiliations for cost-effective coordination of electoral
strategies, but district magnitude may still mechanically
exert a moderating influence. This is why we test for the
joint effects of institutional and contextual variables
(Models 3 and 4). This test shows that district mag-
nitude does have a significant effect, but only in in-
teractive combination with ethnopolitical cleavages. In
the additive Model 3, for instance, district magnitude
has no independent effect on the number of electoral
and legislative parties. But in the fully specified Model
4, which includes an interaction term measuring the
product of district magnitude and the two ethnopoliti-
cal cleavage measures, district magnitude substantially
reduces the number of electoral and legislative parties.9
Large district magnitudes tend to reduce the num-
ber of parties if ethnopolitical fragmentation is high
and ethnopolitical concentration is low, as exempli-
fied by South Africa, but they tend to increase the
number of parties if both fragmentation and concen-
tration are high, as exemplified by Benin. In South
Africa, ethnopolitical groups are highly fragmented
(fragmentation index = 7.89) due to substantial cleav-
ages among the nine groups that comprise the major-
ity African population as well as among the English-
speakers and the Afrikaners that comprise the White
population. They are also spatially dispersed (concen-
9 We used the Aikaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayes
criterion to determine the superiority of the three-way interaction
among district magnitude, ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnop-
olitical concentration over the two-way interaction between district
magnitude and each of the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures.
tration index = 1.6).10 However, the continued strate-
gic importance of race as a cost-effective basis of elec-
toral mobilization diminishes the political significance
of intragroup cleavages among African voters, while
White voters typically tend to divide their votes among
several smaller parties. As a result, the average ef-
fective numbers of electoral and legislative parties in
South Africa over two elections are 2.2 and 2.2, respec-
tively, even though the average district magnitude is 40
seats and the allocation rule is the highly proportional
Largest-Remainder Droop formula.
In Benin, ethnopolitical groups are only slightly
less fragmented than in South Africa (fragmenta-
tion index = 7.30), but they are also more geograph-
ically concentrated, principally in the administrative
provinces that form the electoral districts (concentra-
tion index = 3.0). Combined with an average district
magnitude of 11 seats and with the highly proportional
Largest-Remainder Hare formula as the allocation
rule, this concentration has fostered correspondingly
fragmented party systems, with the average effective
numbers of electoral and legislative parties at 13.0 and
7.0, respectively.
Finally, even moderate levels of geographical con-
centration of ethnopolitical groups tends to offset the
expected constraining effects of ethnopolitical frag-
mentation and small district magnitudes on the num-
ber of parties, as exemplified by Kenya and Malawi. In
both countries, seats are allocated by plurality formula
in single member districts. But in Kenya, which has a
fragmentation index of 9.5 and a concentration index
of 2.3, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative
parties are 4.3 and 3.0, respectively. In Malawi, which
has a fragmentation index of 5.8 and a concentration
index of 2.8, the effective numbers of electoral and leg-
islative parties are 2.8 and 2.8, respectively.
The influence of district magnitude on the structure
of party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies thus
reflects a complex pattern of interaction with ethnop-
olitical cleavages. Large district magnitudes tend to re-
inforce the reductive effect of highly fragmented and
spatially dispersed ethnopolitical groups on the num-
ber of parties. Large district magnitudes tend to re-
inforce the expansive effect of spatially concentrated
but otherwise fragmented ethnopolitical groups on the
number of parties. And small district magnitudes tend
to reduce the number of parties when ethnopolitical
groups are fragmented but tend to increase them when
ethnopolitical groups are spatially concentrated.
Comparing the Effects of ELF and PREG
Indices
To test if the two alternative measures of ethnic het-
erogeneity, the ELF and PREG indices, improve on
10 The Asians and the Coloreds, the other two ethnopolitical groups
in South Africa, are not internally divided. For comparative refer-
ence, the mean, median, and range of the fragmentation indices for
the 34 countries in our data set are 4.38, 3.92, and 1.0–9.91, respec-
tively. The corresponding values for the concentration indices are
1.60, 1.84, and 0.0–3.0, respectively.
387
Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa August 2003
our measures of ethnopolitical cleavages in explaining
variations in the number of electoral and legislative par-
ties in Africa’s emerging democracies, we substituted
them for our measures in the fully specified Model 4,
excluding ethnopolitical concentration because the two
indices do not measure it. The results, not reported
here to save space, show that the two indices have no
significant effect, independently or interactively with
district magnitude. The proximity of presidential and
legislative elections and its interaction with the effec-
tive number of presidential candidates wholly account
for the variance in the number of electoral and legisla-
tive parties.
The nonsignificance of the ELF index is not surpris-
ing. The index measures ethnic heterogeneity by indica-
tors of social cleavages, such as language, but not every
objective indicator of social cleavage possesses intrin-
sic political salience. Indeed, most conventional ethno-
graphic indicators, including, especially, language and
religion, have not acquired the political salience in con-
temporary Africa that they have elsewhere (Mozaffar
and Scarritt 1999). The PREG index, which is other-
wise premised on constructivist logic, was nonsignifi-
cant for two possible reasons. First, the PREG index
was designed to explain the potential impact of eth-
nic heterogeneity on the lack of economic growth in
Africa, and not on electoral outcomes. Thus the levels
of ethnopolitical cleavage captured by its Counts A or
B may not necessarily be the most relevant ones in
electoral politics. Second, it does not measure ethnopo-
litical concentration, which in our analysis consistently
counteracts the impact of fragmentation.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our results demonstrate that, in Africa’s emerging
democracies, both electoral institutions and ethnopo-
litical cleavages shape the structure of party systems,
but not reflexively. They do so contingently and strate-
gically. Our results thus point up the need to replace the
misconstrued institutions-or-cleavages debate in the
comparative literature on party systems with a more
analytically sound theoretical specification that privi-
leges neither institutions nor cleavages but allows for
systematically sorting out their independent and joint
effects. Our results also demonstrate that ethnopoliti-
cal cleavage measures based on constructivist specifica-
tion of ethnopolitical groups improve on explanations
that utilize measures of ethnic heterogeneity based on
primordialist specification. Our results thus underscore
the importance of systematic incorporation of construc-
tivist insights in comparative research agendas.
Finally, our results demonstrate the significance of
both ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical
concentration, the latter heretofore unexamined in com-
parative scholarship, in influencing the number of
electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s emerging
democracies. In particular, they clarify the complex
ways in which the two cleavage dimensions indepen-
dently and interactively with each other and with elec-
toral institutions shape the structure of party systems.
By influencing the effective number of presidential
candidates, ethnopolitical cleavages moderate the re-
ductive effects of the proximity of presidential and
legislative elections on the number of parties, encour-
aging the formation of electoral alliances between ma-
jor presidential contenders seeking electoral victory
and minor ones controlling critical blocs of votes that
can secure it. By counteracting the reductive effects of
ethnopolitical fragmentation, moreover, ethnopolitical
concentration helps to increase the number of elec-
toral and legislative parties, expanding opportunities
for electoral competition and political representation.
But district magnitude limits excessive party system
fragmentation due to this expansive effect. It reinforces
the reductive effect of ethnopolitical fragmentation,
enabling geographically concentrated voters voting as a
bloc to increase the number of electoral and legislative
parties. But it interacts with both cleavage dimensions
to offset excessive party system fragmentation.
These complex relationships between electoral in-
stitutions and ethnopolitical cleavages have fostered in
Africa’s emerging democracies electoral and legislative
party systems that are characterized by relatively low
levels of fragmentation. For example, the data in Table 3
show that for all 62 elections in 34 countries that we
analyze, the mean values of the effective numbers of
electoral and legislative parties are 3.2 (SD = 2.7) and
2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respectively; the corresponding
median values are 2.4 and 2.0 parties, respectively. For
47 multiple elections in 19 countries, the mean values
for effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties
are 3.1 (SD = 2.4) and 2.3 (SD = 1.5) parties, respec-
tively; the corresponding median values are 2.4 and 2.0
respectively. And for 15 single elections in 15 countries,
the average effective numbers of electoral parties and
legislative parties are 3.7 (SD = 3.4) and 2.5 (SD = 1.5)
parties, respectively; the corresponding median values
are 2.5 and 2.2, respectively. This remarkable conver-
gence of Africa’s emerging democracies around some
semblance of party system stability obtains even in the
face of high levels of underlying electoral and legislative
volatility. For example, the data in Table 3 also show
that for the 47 multiple elections (ranging from 2 to 5
elections), the mean electoral volatility index (based on
votes) is 27.87 and the mean legislative volatility index
(based on seats) is 22.96.11 These indices are compara-
tively lower than those reported for new democracies
in post-World War II western Europe and in southern
Europe in the 1970s but are roughly comparable
to those reported for the new democracies in Latin
America in the 1980s and in the former communist
states in eastern Europe in the 1990s. In all these new
democracies, moreover, high electoral volatility coin-
cides with high party system fragmentation (Bielasiak
2002). That high electoral volatility coincides with
low party system fragmentation in Africa’s emerging
democracies is thus a paradox. Our analysis suggests
three reasons for this paradox.
11 We use Pedersen’s (1983) volatility index, which is calculated by
adding the net percentage change in the votes (or seats) won by each
party from one election to the next and dividing the sum by two.
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TABLE 3. Mean and Median Values of Effective Numbers of Electoral and
Legislative Parties and Indices of Electoral and Legislative Volatility
Effective Number of Effective Number of
Electoral Parties Legislative Parties
Number of elections












Volatility indices for 47 multiple elections
Mean electoral volatility index 27.87
Mean legislative volatility index 22.96
First, because of the manifest programmatic and or-
ganizational weakness of African political parties, can-
didates rely principally on ethnopolitical group sup-
port to win. But, because of intergroup and intragroup
cleavages, few African ethnopolitical groups possess
sufficient numerical strength and internal cohesion to
propel a candidate to victory on their own. Candidates,
therefore, forge ethnopolitical coalitions to secure vic-
tory in each election. However, because of the very
morphology that encourages them in the first place,
these election-specific coalitions tend to shift from elec-
tion to election, increasing electoral volatility. Second,
because characteristic problems of limited information
about new electoral institutions and the extent of elec-
toral support in postauthoritarian democracies vitiate
the constraints of strategic barriers to entry in elec-
toral competition (Cox 1997, 151–72), excessively large
numbers of candidates and parties, most lacking even
minimum levels of electoral support, compete in demo-
cratic elections in Africa’s emerging democracies. This
typically results in a highly skewed vote distribution,
with a small number of candidates and parties win-
ning by substantial majorities, in high levels of elec-
toral volatility, in the emergence of a small number of
electoral and legislative parties, and hence in relatively
concentrated party systems. Finally, these two reasons
suggest a curvilinear relationship between ethnopolit-
ical fragmentation and the structure of party systems
in Africa’s emerging democracies. Low fragmentation
correlates in a straightforward way with a small number
of parties and low party system fragmentation. High
fragmentation encourages the formation of intergroup
coalitions that also help to reduce the number of parties
and party system fragmentation. But moderate levels
of fragmentation, combined with the countervailing ef-
fect of concentration, increase the number of parties
and party system fragmentation, with district magni-
tude exerting an additional moderating influence to
diminish the prospect of excessive increases in both.
The complex interaction of electoral institutions and
ethnopolitical cleavages thus structures the conversion
of electoral volatility into concentrated party systems
in Africa’s emerging and unconsolidated democracies.
What are the implications of our analysis for the sta-
bility of these democracies? We conclude with three
speculative answers. First, both the dominant multieth-
nic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages captured by our
data set and the resulting structures of electoral and leg-
islative party systems revealed by our data analysis are
generally conducive for democratic consolidation. The
multiethnic pattern of ethnopolitical cleavages exerts
pressure toward the formation of multiethnic electoral
coalitions that, in turn, engender party systems without
excessive fragmentation. Such party systems facilitate
the formation of multiethnic governing coalitions. Sec-
ond, to the extent that elections remain the principal le-
gitimate source of forming and changing governments,
increasing information on the effects of electoral insti-
tutions and the extent of electoral support engenders a
learning process for both voters and candidates that is
likely to improve the prospect of strategic coordination
among competing ethnopolitical groups over a small
number of winning candidates.12 This will also help to
lower the current high rate of electoral volatility and
the associated cost of forming multiethnic coalitions in
each election.
Finally, our analysis suggests that no intrinsic an-
tipathy exists between ethnopolitical diversity and
democratic stability in Africa or, for that matter, else-
where. Claims of such antipathy typically posit a re-
flexive relationship between ethnicity and democracy
that is grossly misconstrued, rests on the fundamen-
tally flawed primordialist conception of ethnicity, and
reflects an odious one-dimensional view of ethnic iden-
tities. Our data and analysis show, instead, that clar-
ifying the relationship between ethnicity and democ-
racy requires (a) conceiving ethnicity as a strategic
12 Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) present a systematic analysis of this
process in Senegal, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea.
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resource that is contingently politicized and (b) pay-
ing close attention to variations in the configuration of
resulting ethnopolitical cleavages. Democratic stability
is typically threatened when ethnopolitical cleavages
reflect the configuration of deeply divided societies in
which two internally cohesive, sharply polarized, and
spatially mixed groups are implacably arrayed against
each other, as exemplified most brutally in contem-
porary Africa by Rwanda and Burundi.13 Our data
and analysis reveal, however, that ethnopolitical cleav-
ages in the other 38 African countries manifest a pre-
dominantly multiethnic configuration engendered by
the combination of salient intergroup and intragroup
cleavages.14 Within the dominant multiethnic configu-
rations of African countries, therefore, variations in the
incidence and interaction of ethnopolitical fragmenta-
tion and concentration, and in the interaction of these
two cleavage dimensions with electoral institutions, of-
fer partial but crucial insights into, as well as reasons
for cautious optimism about, the relationship between
ethnopolitical diversity and the prospective stability of
Africa’s emerging democracies.
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